Why do some individuals tolerate undemocratic behaviour—such as corruption, state repression, and even outright authoritarian practices—while others remain committed to democratic norms even under adverse conditions?

My book project focuses on explaining the difference between committed and conditional democrats. Existing explanations of democratic behaviour and attitudes in comparative politics often rely on material or social incentives. My research instead draws from moral psychology, sociology, and anthropology to argue that moral judgements—how behaviour and ideas are placed on the right/wrong scale—underpin citizens’ willingness to justify or condemn undemocratic acts. And that this judgment’s effect is mediated by an individual’s social identity, in other words, by the groups they consider important for their sense of self. What individuals consider “fair,” “harmful,” or “acceptable” depends on the reference groups they prioritise: those who confine moral concern to inmedite in-groups are more likely to tolerate rule-breaking by insiders and discount potential harms towards broader commmunities, whereas those who consider broader communities as an important component of their social identity would be more likely to uphold democratic norms even in adverse conditions.